MITSIS, Ph., — Epicurus Ethical Theory. The Pleasures of Invulnerability.
Cornell University Press, Ithaca / London, 1988. IX,184p. Original cloth bound with dust wrappers. Spine silver titled. Signature and date on free endpaper. Series: Cornell Studies in Classical Philology. ‘This is a very good book on an important and neglected topic. (…) This book (…) unites a classicist’s grasp of linguistic, textual and historical issues with a disciplined and rigorous scrutiny of philosophical issues and arguments, as Mitsis glances very well in the complex tasks of historical reconstruction and philosophical discussion. As a result, we have a complex and subtle account of some central topics in Epicurus’ ethical thought, one that will be a major focus of discussion for years to come. Even more important, the book will help readers of many kinds begin to retrieve an Epicurus who is a far richer and more exciting ethical thinker than the crudely dogmatic hedonist many take him to be. Epicurus, like most of the Hellenistic philosophers, believed that human beings live troubled and miserable lives because they do not think correctly. He held that they have false beliefs about the nature of the universe, about life and death, about what is worth choosing and what is not. As a result of these false beliefs, they form desires that cannot be satisfied and are bound to torment them; the desire for immortality, the desires characteristic of erotic love, desires for wealth, luxuries, fame, political power. What is bad about all these desires is that they give the person a live of slavish dependency, in which they are at the mercy of the contingencies of life in many ways. What a truly happy life requires, by contrast, is self-sufficiency, the condition in which the most important things are all securely within one’s grasp. Hellenistic philosophers characteristically aim at self-sufficiency not through political change (…) by a ‘therapy’ of thought and desire, so that they will cease to think important, and cease therefore to long for, the things that circumstances have put beyond their firm control. (…) As mists shows, it is a deep part of Greek ethical belief that ‘eudaimonia’, the good life for a human being, must be ‘complete’, must, that is, include everything that has intrinsic worth, everything without which a reasonable person will judge the life to be impoverished, lacking in value. (…) Wealth, immortality, luxurious foods, fame, even erotic love - all these can be shown by reasonable compelling arguments to be things that are not needed for complete ‘eudaemonia’ and the desires for these things to be, in consequence, desires that a truly reasonable person will not have. But the situation is otherwise when friendship and the moral virtues are in question. These clearly render life less fully controlled, placing part of the agent’s well-being at the disposal of other people and their circumstances. (…) Mitsis’ aim is to trace the tensions this produces in Epicurus’ ethics, recovering the rich and multifaceted character of his thought about the other-directed aspects of the truly pleasant life. Mitsis begins with a chapter on pleasure. (…) Epicurus’ claim would be, that (…) a complexly active condition, free from bodily and mental impediment (of bodily and mental anxiety) is what the gook human life really is. This healthy condition of the natural organism, (…) does not require wealth, or fame, or luxuries difficult to acquire. And it is this simple functioning, rather than fame, wealth, or sensual indulgence, that intelligent agents will pursue. This account makes pleasure something active, rather than a mere zero state. (…) It is a break-through for our understanding of Epicurus’ ethics (…). Mitsis now uses these insights to investigate tensions in Epicurus’ position on the virtues.’ (MARTH NUSSBAUM in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, sept.1991, pp.677-687).